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MULTICULTURAL RIGHTS? NATURAL LAW AND
THE RECONCILIATION OF UNIVERSAL NORMS
WITH PARTICULAR CULTURES
Bruce P. Frohnen'
This Article addresses a problem of legal reasoning that has particular
importance for contemporary international law: how can lawyers
promote universal human rights in a world of particularistic cultures?
This problem is especially acute given international law's twin goals of
effective defense of the rights of all people and avoidance of the brute
imposition of Western values on non-Western peoples. First, this Article
contends that contemporary international law has failed to provide an
adequate conceptual structure through which to consider how one ought
to apply universal standards to particular circumstances. Second, this
Article proposes that the long-standing tradition of natural law reasoning
offers an adequate conceptual structure. This Article makes the latter
assertion through an examination of the natural law jurisprudence of
eighteenth century writer and statesman, Edmund Burke.
This Article will argue that Burke's natural law is particularly useful to
address the problem of international human rights in a multicultural
world. Burkean natural law emphasizes the role of history in shaping
cultures and guiding the application of universal norms. Burke
understood local law as embodying both particular traditions and
universal norms. Thus, in seeking to protect universal rights, he
recognized the need to respect and maintain the coherence of ongoing
cultures and societies, lest the people's expectations and rights be
violated.
I begin by outlining international law's failure to express and apply
universal standards to traditional cultures in a manner that protects
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human rights while also respecting indigenous ways of life. I then discuss
natural law theory as a possible solution to this conundrum of
international human rights. I argue against the position that natural law
is inadequate to reconcile universal norms with particular circumstances.
Critics of natural law maintain that natural law is relatively uninformed
regarding the importance of history and historical circumstance. In
arguing against this view, I turn in particular to the natural law
jurisprudence of Edmund Burke. I argue that Burke integrates crucial
elements of historical, moral, and political thinking. The result is a
jurisprudence allowing Burke to work for greater protections of universal
human rights, for example, in his opposition to slavery, while respecting
and protecting indigenous cultures and societies.
THE CONUNDRUM OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
International law increasingly is aimed at changing the practices of
local cultures to bring them more in line with universal principles of
human rights.' For example, the Report of the United Nations
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) discusses conditions in Indonesia and argues that "cultural
and religious values cannot be allowed to undermine the universality of
women's rights."2 Early on, the report notes that in all countries cultural
and religious values are the most significant reasons for women's
reluctance to participate in public life.3
The opposition of international law to local culture manifests a serious
conflict in contemporary legal discourse. Those advocating international
human rights often posit universal standards in opposition to parochial
1. See Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74
IND. L.J. 1397, 1416-1.7 (1999) (arguing that international law is enforced through
institutional interaction, interpretation of legal norms, and internalization of those norms
into domestic legal systems).
2. Report on Indonesia, U.N. COMMI'FIEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, 18th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/53/38 Rev. 1, 282 (1998).
3. See id.; see also Radhika Coomaraswamy, U.N. Special Rapportuer on Violence
Against Women, Reinventing International Law: Women's Rights as Human Rights in the
International Community, Edward A. Smith Lecture Delivered at Harvard Law School
(March 12, 1996) (arguing that "the demands of the international women's movement" to
new and increased rights for women are "under challenge from alternative cultural
expressions" and hoping "that the common values of human dignity and freedom will
triumph over parochial forces" opposed to the view that every human should be permitted
the same substantive rights, regardless of the culture in which that human resides),
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/HRP/Publications/radhika.htm (last
visited Mar. 28, 2002).
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customs. 4  Others criticize this vision and assert that non-European
peoples deserve greater respect, particularly in regard to their indigenous
cultures Those seeking to spread a code of universal human rights must
now reconcile the fact that the values they espouse are viewed by many
as impositions on preexisting cultures, oppressed for generations in the
name of European visions of what is right and what is legal.6 This is
particularly true in the case of Islamic nations, a number of which have
entered significant reservations to compliance with CEDAW's Article
Two, which requires the abolition of discrimination against women in
laws, customs, and practices. Geraldine A. del Prado noted CEDAW's
"unlimited scope" in its requirement that states "pursue by all
appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating
discrimination against women."7  According to del Prado, such
reservations, based on adherence to Sharia or Islamic law, undermine
CEDAW's "requirement to abolish discriminatory laws, customs, and
practices."8 Thus, there is no universal agreement on the existence, let
alone the content, of universal human rights equally applicable to all
persons. Steve Redhead notes that, even among feminist legal scholars,
there has been significant movement away from a "jurisprudence of
equality" to a "jurisprudence of difference," from the desire to enforce
4. See, e.g., Celestine I. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development
Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41
HARV. INT'L L.J. 381, 382 (2000) (discussing "abolitionist" feminist activism in non-
European countries). Nyamu posits a necessary conflict between universal rights and
particular cultures, arguing that "[p]roponents of gender equality must appropriate
positive openings presented by cultural and religious traditions." Id.; cf. Lino J. Lauro &
Peter A. Samuelson, Toward Pluralism in Sudan: A Traditionalist Approach, 37 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 65, 67 (1996) (advocating a policy of building on Islamic law in seeking peace
and cooperation in Sudan).
5. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in
Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 7 (1999) (arguing that
international law was created by European colonialists to denigrate indigenous cultures in
order to justify conquest and colonization).
6. See, e.g., J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
435-36 (1968). Verzijl states that one simply cannot question that
the actual body of international law, as it stands today, not only is the product of
the conscious activity of the European mind, but has also drawn its vital essence
from a common source of European beliefs, and in both of these aspects it is
mainly of Western European origin.
Id.
7. Geraldine A. del Prado, The United Nations and the Promotion and Protection of
the Rights of Women: How Well Has the Organization Fulfilled Its Responsibility?, 2 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 51, 70 (1995) (citing CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR,
34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, Analysis, Article 21, $$ 93-101).
8. Id.
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standards such as equal pay to a push to enforce standards such as
working for a "feminine writing of the body-in-law."9
Concomitant to the lack of moral consensus underlying claims to
universal rights is the absence of a theory of law that would allow the
enforcement of such rights in nations that do not accept them. Treaties
intended to establish and enforce universal human rights, such as the
1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, constitute
international law. Such international law, in Antony Anghie's words, "is
universal. It is a body of law that applies to all states regardless of their
specific cultures, belief systems, and political organizations.""' However,
it is important to note the inherent limitation of international law as
currently constituted: "It is a common set of doctrines that all states use
to regulate relations with each other."1' Because international law
concerns relations among sovereign states, instruments of international
law, such as the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, are binding only on
those who have consented to them - their signatories; they cannot be
used as legal instruments by which to extend human rights to nations that
do not accept them.
1 2
This conundrum of human rights laws, which are inapplicable in
nations that wish to engage in the practices legislators would outlaw,
arises from a prevalent conception of law. Law today is primarily seen
through the lens of positivism, 3 which "asserts, not only that the
sovereign administers and enforces the law, but that law itself is the
creation of sovereign will. 1 4 As positivists view law as the will of the
sovereign, law can be created only by sovereigns. Thus, international
law, on positivist terms, can only be that to which sovereign states have
agreed. If nation states do not agree to a code of universal human rights
9. STEVE REDHEAD, UNPOPULAR CULTURES: THE BIRTH OF LAW AND POPULAR
CULTURE 84 (1995).
10. Anghie, supra note 5, at 1.
11. Id.
12. Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and General Principles, 84 AUSTL.Y.B.I.L. 82-108, reprinted in BRUNO SIMMA &
PHILIP ALSTON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 3-8 (Philip Alston ed., 1996).
13. Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale,
103 YALE L.J. 1651, 1653 (1994). Berman points out that most of the multiplicity of
contemporary legal approaches (e.g., law and economics, critical legal studies, and feminist
theories) "fall unconsciously into the positivist category, sometimes with an unconscious
admixture of natural law theory." Id. at 1655 n.8. In Berman's view, all of these
approaches share hostility toward historical experience as a source of legitimacy. Id.
14. Anghie, supra note 5, at 10; see also Berman, supra note 13, at 1653 ("Positivism
treats law essentially as a body of rules laid down ('posited') and enforced by the supreme
lawmaking authority, the sovereign.").
[Vol. 52:39
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espoused by any particular writer, group, or organization, those rights
cannot be enforced as law - at least in regard to those states that refuse
to consent.' 5
Lawyers and jurists alike have sought to compensate for the inefficacy
of international treaties in enforcing human rights by using the language
of cultural norms as an aid in constructing customary law. 6 These
advocates seek to create, through imaginative application and
interpretation of certain documents and rhetorical statements, a proto-
law that has been dubbed "instant custom."' 7 Bruno Simma and Philip
Alston, commentators on the subject, note that the traditional manner by
which customary law gains decision-making value is through actual
practice within a given state; it develops into a legal norm through
persistent use and eventual acceptance by domestic jurists. 8 Today,
however, an increasing number of lawyers and jurists claim that
customary law is created in the very process of working through
international bodies, such as the United Nations, to draft language
concerning state action in regard to human rights. Under this view, the
process itself shapes general principles into law-like forms and provides
them with the widespread acceptance necessary to treat these principles
as customary law.' 9 Such claims attach in particular to influential United
Nations documents such as the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights.0
Simma and Alston caution that this movement may undermine a lawyer's
ability to recognize what is truly customary, such as customs embedded
in the practices of a given state; likewise, they caution that the movement
may decrease a lawyer's capacity to formulate and enforce specific,
15. See Anghie, supra note 5, at 13 (describing how states could manifest sovereign
will through consent to a set of customary laws).
16. See, e.g., Simma & Alston, supra note 12, at 7 (citing German and Australian
cases in which judges refused to interpret domestic law as inconsistent with general rules
of international law). On the limits of international customary law in the American
context, see Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law and Private Rights of Action,
I CHI. J. INT'L L. 421, 427-29 (2000) (asserting that while the majority of courts have held
that customary law has the status of federal common law, the existence of a private cause
of action thereunder is limited to specifically enacted legislative provisions).
17. Simma & Alston, supra note 12, at 10-11.
18. See id. at 9-10 (quoting 2 HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
418 (1952)) (citing Kelsen's dictum that "states ought to behave as they have customarily
behaved").
19. See id. at 10-11; see also M. Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law,
47 BRITISH Y.B.I.L. 1, 53 (1977) (arguing that words, texts, and votes, by encompassing
reasoned argumentation, may replace the need for actual practice in establishing
customary law).
20. See Simma & Alston, supra note 12, at 11.
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useful rules in international law.21 They also are concerned about
American ethnocentricity in the norms deemed to have the force of
customary law."
Simma and Alston's critique of instant custom rests in part on the
similarity they find between attempts to fit international declarations into
the forms of customary law jurisprudence and natural law
jurisprudence.23 They argue that "general principles have not fared too
well as a source of international law, mainly due to their natural law
flavour and the uncertainties surrounding the ways in which they are to
be established and applied., 24  Because they are seeking to impose
principles that have little or no basis in the practice of the target state,
creators of "instant custom" are simply trying to impose their own vision
of propriety and legality on states that fail to act as the creators of the
"instant custom" want them to act in regard to human rights.25 Thus, the
charge of cultural imperialism retains its basis through the conduct of
human rights advocates.
Simma and Alston recommend avoiding the problem of a moralistic
natural law by working toward a consensus in the interpretation and
application of general principles regarding international human rights.
26
This suggestion, however, does not address the question of how an
organization can win the consent of a state that does not wish to accede
to international human rights standards as formulated in legal sources
such as United Nations documents. Some international organizations
have sought to work around this problem by breaking down the
distinction between political and non-political spheres through the use of
21. See id. at 12, 17.
22. See id. at 15-16 (noting the similarity between "universal" customary rights and
those found in the U.S. Bill of Rights and noting that international customary law excludes
certain rights that are not considered as important under U.S. law, such as the right to
freedom of association).
23. See id. at 28.
24. Id. (advocating a consensual approach by which United Nations documents
rooted in the 1948 Charter are afforded authoritative status in guiding further
interpretation and formulation of customary law rooted in state practice).
25. See id. Note, for example, the emphasis on "education" as a means of changing
long-held beliefs and customs regarding issues such as the proper role and rights of women
in CEDAW. See del Prado, supra note 7, at 59-60. Within CEDAW's policy rubric,
education and dissemination of information are considered imperative to the
accomplishment of equality. Special importance is given to teaching equality to
young children and mobilizing them to act as future leaders for change. Agents
of the state, including the judiciary and the police force, must also be educated
on gender equality and the special legal needs of women ....
Id. at 59. Contrary beliefs and structures constitute "[oJbstacles to development." Id.
26. See Simon & Alston, supra note 12, at 28.
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non-governmental activist organizations." Such attempts, however,
actually exacerbate the basic problem. By seeking to foster remedies
outside the law, these international organizations highlight the issue of
culture. Attempts to impose universal human rights through positive law
may eschew moral argumentation. On positive law principles, if it is the
will of the sovereign that certain activities be protected or banned, and
the sovereign enacts laws to that effect, the laws will protect or ban such
activity. 8 The use of means or arguments beyond the law, on the other
hand, must entail some kind of didactic element. When activist
organizations attempt to persuade the target government of the
rationality, profitability, or morality of acceding to universal notions of
human rights, the organizations play the role of a teacher explaining to a
presumably recalcitrant or ignorant student its own interests or the rules
of morality. This is true whether the activist group is comprised of U.N.
observers, Western lawyers, or local activists who have "bought into"
universal principles of human rights. It seems clear, then, that the
conflict between assertions of universal rights and the sanctity of local
cultures is, at base, normative and encompasses cultural, historical,
political, and legal issues.
27. See Abdullahi An-Na'im, State Responsibility Under International Human Rights
Law To Change Religious and Customary Laws, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, 167, 173-74 (Rebecca J. Cook ed.,
1994) (seeking "a genuinely reciprocal global collaborative effort" involving local culture
and international voluntary organizations in the promotion of rights for women). See
generally Symposium, The United Nations Family: Challenges of Law and Development, 36
HARV. INT'L L.J. 267 (1995); Alasdair MacIntyre, A Partial Response to My Critics, in
AFTER MACINTYRE 283 (1994) (arguing that moral norms must be formulated and
enforced at the local level).
28. Berman, supra note 13, at 1653.
29. Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism:
The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1093-95, 1097 (1996) (providing a telling
example of the conundrum into which multicultural approaches to positive law can fall).
Coleman argues for a jurisprudence that balances what she deems to be two overtly
liberal, progressive, and undeniably sound goals: granting subjective justice to each
individual based on the accused's view of whether, and to what extent, he did wrong, and
expanding legal protection of women and children. Id. at 1095. The problem situation
Coleman addresses is that of crimes committed by immigrants who claim their home
culture would not deem such conduct criminal. Id. at 1100-02. The problem is that these
home societies often condone what American tradition deems unconscionable treatment
of the very women and children in need of protection. Id. at 1095-97. Coleman's
"balancing" of the interests of subjectivism and protectionism posits goals without
justifying them morally, historically, or logically. By definition, the balancing cannot
succeed because one cannot harmonize polar opposites; one can only choose between
them. For a critique of attempts to recognize cultural differences as positing a "terrible
choice between racial/ethnic solidarity and the struggle for gender equality," see generally
2002]
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Yet, despite a Western aversion to being labeled morally righteous, a
working consensus sometimes arises regarding the morality or
immorality of certain acts. 3° Ruth E. Gordon has argued that, in recent
years, there has been relative international acceptance of short-term
United Nations intervention aimed at ending large-scale killings of
civilians and insuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance. 3' However,
even in dealing with the application of international criminal law to gross
violations of human dignity, the key to enforcement has been the
willingness of officials in the target country to hold the accused
responsible.32 Indeed, both sides in disputes over the application of
international law have been accused of interpreting the law and the
concept of sovereignty so as to serve the targeted ends. 3  The United
States, a founding, permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council, has been notably reluctant to apply international law to itself.
34
Daina C. Chiu, Comment, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and
Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1053, 1057 (1994).
30. See, e.g., Anthony Chase, Legal Guardians: Islamic Law, International Law,
Human Rights Law, and the Salman Rushdie Affair, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 375,
421 (1996). Chase recounted the dialogue between Tariq Modood, who proposes
extension of British libel law to any statement found offensive by any minority religion,
and Leonard Levy, who sees such communal libel rules as ultimately eliminating freedom
of expression. Id. Chase sides with Levy, arguing that group libel protections, though
aimed at eliminating intolerance, in effect, would work against a tolerant society by
empowering minority religious groups to stifle open debate. Id. at 421-22.
31. See generally Ruth E. Gordon, Humanitarian Intervention by the United Nations:
Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 43, 46 (1996). But cf Tara Sapru, Comment,
Into the Heart of Darkness: The Case Against the Foray of the Security Council Tribunal
into the Rwandan Crisis, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 329 (1997) (arguing that the U.N. Security
Council acted ultra vires in setting up a tribunal to prosecute human rights abuses in
Rwanda, potentially undermining the legitimacy of all international human rights efforts).
32. See Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, 33 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 237, 238 (1998) (detailing inconsistencies of applications of international
criminal law during times of war and peace alike).
33. See id. at 238. For a discussion of recent calls for a consolidation of American
global hegemony, see Bruce P. Frohnen & Charles J. Reid, Jr., Diversity in Western
Constitutionalism: Chartered Rights, Federated Structure, and Natural-Law Reasoning in
Burke's Theory of Empire, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27, 28-29 n.l (1997) and citations
therein. See also Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and
International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 960 (2000) (reviewing STEPHEN D. KRASNER,
SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999)) (arguing that "sovereignty" is a term
manipulated by powerful countries to serve their own interests, to impose their wills on
weaker countries in the name of universal rules, and to prevent application of those rules
to themselves on the basis their right to self-rule).
34. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the
International Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 529-30 (1999) (discussing Breard v.
Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998), in which the Supreme Court refused to stay execution of a
Paraguayan citizen convicted of murder and attempted rape in Virginia, despite the
[Vol. 52:39
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To the extent that such proclamations aim beyond the conduct of
relations between nations to cultural practices within nations, they
constitute normative statements as to what laws should be promulgated
in all nations. 5 Political, economic, or social action attempts to influence
such sovereign decisions, whatever their philosophical or institutional
bases. Such attempts are less "law like" than votes of an elected
legislature or decrees from an unelected ruler.36 To the extent that
international law is part of an attempt to change the internal policies of
any country, it must be used to motivate particular nation states to
change their public policies and force broader changes in cultural
traditions and practices.37
Is NATURAL LAW INADEQUATE?
Positive law is not inherently self-justifying - particularly to those not
already subject to it. Arguments must be made concerning why human
rights should be defended through legal means if the goal is to establish
those means other than by force. But on what basis can this be argued?
One traditional approach is embodied in natural law. We might consider
court's acknowledgement that Virginia violated the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations by failing to advise Breard at the time of his arrest of his right to confer with his
consulate, and notwithstanding the provisional order of the International Court of Justice
ordering the United States to take all measures at its disposal to stay that execution).
35. See, e.g., James C.N. Paul, The United Nations and the Creation of an International
Law of Development, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307, 307-28 (1995) (advocating the use of an
international law of development based in formulations of general human rights principles
to force states to allow non-governmental organizations to participate in all levels of
government and help craft business regulations).
36. See Ratner, supra note 32, at 256. Ratner argued that "traditional" means of
influencing sovereign behavior include not only treaties and other instruments of
international law, but also publicity, diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, and military
intervention. Id.; see also ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY 8 (1995) (applying economic analysis of norms of behavior and their
influence on law to the behavior of nation states).
37. See Nyamu, supra note 4, at 392 (arguing that the United Nations, in attempting
to change gender-biased cultural practices, uses "state-centric, shaming techniques" in its
effort to change government policies); see also Anghie, supra note 5, at 4, 10 (noting that
international law during the nineteenth century shed its natural law origins in favor of a
positivist view). This positivist view of international law "distinguished between civilized
states and non-civilized states and asserted further that international law applied only to
the sovereign states that composed the civilized 'Family of Nations."' Id. at 4. Even in
instances where mutual interests might be seen as dictating universalist accommodation,
such mutuality of interest can be hard to find. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Universal Priorities, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 27, 27-45 (1998) (arguing that despite a consensus
on the need for a uniform bankruptcy system to effect substantial economic reform, the
United States is a minority in seeking universal bankruptcy filing while most countries
maintain a territorial system in which local judges allocate assets only to local entities).
20021
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"[t]he naturalist international law that had applied in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries [and that] asserted that a universal international
law deriving from human reason applied to all peoples, European or
non-European.,, 38 Naturalist international law, itself based in reason and
morality, provides a basis for universal rights arguments. As Harold
Berman states, "[n]atural law theory treats law essentially as the
embodiment in rules and concepts of moral principles that are derived
ultimately from reason and conscience.""
Legal positivism, so prevalent in current jurisprudence, developed in
opposition to the natural law vision.40 Beginning in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries, followers of William of Ockham, who asserted the
primacy of will over reason, in conjunction with followers of Marsilius of
Padua, who asserted the coercive nature of all government and law,
began to develop a positivist theory of law.4 It was during the nineteenth
century, however, that positivism came to triumph, particularly in the
area of international law.4' This Article contends that natural law
provides a framework through which to view human rights issues that is
superior to the positivism that has displaced it from the center of
jurisprudential discourse.
Natural law has its roots in a religious conception of the human person
and the rights and obligations flowing from that person's relationship
with his creator.43 It provides a set of universal standards that transcend
38. Anghie, supra note 5, at 4.
39. Berman, supra note 13, at 1653.
40. See id. at 1652-53.
41. See id. at 1654.
42. Anghie, supra note 5, at 1-2.
43. See generally MYRES McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 68-71,
73-75 (1980), excerpted in FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS 211-12 (3d ed. 2001) (arguing that natural law assumes that there are
laws existing in nature - both theological and metaphysical - that confer rights upon
individuals as human beings). McDougal et al. assert that the two sources of these rights
are divine will and metaphysical absolutes, which constitute a higher law than is identified
with humankind and requires protections of individual rights. Id.; see also JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 25-29 (1980) (positing that, according to
naturalists, the basis of the validity of all legal systems rests on the will of the Supreme
Being, God-created law, or the law of nature). See generally Matthew Lippman, Art and
Ideology in the Third Reich: The Protection of Cultural Property and the Humanitarian
Law of War, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L. 18 (1998) (tracing the natural law roots of international
law). The inalienability and inviolability of certain rights and the natural law roots of
these rights are also reflected in the language of the American Declaration of
Independence, which proclaims the self-evident truth "that all Men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
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particular cultural and historical circumstances, making it possible for
disciplined observers to judge the conduct of both individuals and
nations.44 As such, it seems well suited to provide the basis for rules
regarding the formulation and enforcement of human rights in the
international arena. However, there is significant opposition to such
arguments, particularly from legal academia.45 Some critics, espousing
feminist, multicultural, and other positions rooted in critiques of
traditional Western institutions, argue that natural law is de-legitimized
by its history and point to the injustices that natural law arguments have
been used to defend. 46 At base, such criticisms assert that natural law is
simply the name those in power give to the rules they happen to value or
find convenient for their own ends.47  Other critics have argued that
para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also CHARLES RICE, 50 QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW:
WHAT IT IS AND WHY WE NEED IT 34 (1999) (arguing that natural law is exemplified by
Sophocles' Antigone, which portrayed the law of Zeus, or Justice, as an override to man's
law).
44. See RICE, supra note 43, at 35-39 (citing Aristotle, Cicero, Coke, Blackstone,
Hamilton, and George Mason on this point); see also PETER J. STANLIS, EDMUND BURKE
AND THE NATURAL LAW 7 (1986) ("Natural Law was an eternal, unchangeable, and
universal ethical norm or standard, whose validity was independent of man's will;
therefore, at all times, in all circumstances and everywhere it bound all individuals, races,
nations, and governments.").
45. See J. ROLAND PENNOCK, RIGHTS, NATURAL RIGHTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS -
A GENERAL VIEW IN HUMAN RIGHTS 3 n.8 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1981) (noting that the doctrine of natural rights was criticized because of its
association with metaphysical or theological doctrines). For a treatment of international
legal issues rejecting the natural law rooted categories of Western jurisprudence, see
Isabelle R. Gunning, Expanding the International Definition of Refugee: A Multicultural
View, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 35, 37 (1989-90) (arguing that the U.N. Charter concept of
legal equality of all nations requires that the international definition of refugee be
expanded to include a multicultural perspective rather than the more restricted Western
view); see also Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The
Challenge of Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 213 (1991) (applying feminist and
Afro-centric theories to illustrate the cooperative and coercive aspects of state
sovereignty).
46. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Multivocal Prejudices and Homo Equality, 74 IND.
L.J. 1085, 1111 (1999) (noting that natural law arguments were used historically by males
to enforce "compulsory heterosexuality" and suppress women's desire for independence).
For an extensive review of the arguments against natural law, see Robert P. George,
Natural Law and Civil Rights: From Jefferson's 'Letter to Henry Lee' to Martin Luther
King's 'Letter From a Birmingham Jail,' 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 143, 156 (1993) (summing
up criticisms of natural law as the view that "'natural law' is a mere euphemism for
legitimizing the status quo, thus reinforcing structures of domination and power").
47. See generally George, supra note 46; see also John T. Noonan, Jr., Development in
Moral Doctrine, 54 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 662, 671 (1993) (citing John T. Noonan, Jr.,
The Philosophical Postulates of Alfred Loisy (1948) (unpublished M.A. thesis, The
Catholic University of America)) (asserting that according to modernist theologians,
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natural law is too ahistorical; its normative statements lack any basis in
the actual conduct of social and political life.4" Thus, both sets of critics
agree in asserting that natural law fails to take sufficient account of
history - whether concerning past injustices or the historical context in
which current conduct takes place.
It is precisely the element of historical consciousness that, according to
Harold Berman, is missing in both contemporary natural law and
positivist jurisprudence.4 9 Contrary to modern, ahistorical jurisprudence,
Berman notes that "[e]ver since the early formation of discrete modern
Western legal systems in the twelfth century, it had been taken for
granted that a legal system has an ongoing character, a capacity for
growth over generations and centuries."50 This belief that legal systems,
like cultures, have an ingrown mechanism for organic change underlies
the jurisprudence of the historical school." By the seventeenth century, a
significant number of scholars were arguing that "the past history of a
legal system embodies basic norms which not only do govern but also,
because of their historicity, should govern subsequent developments and
which bind the sovereign political authority itself."52 This emphasis on
the integrity of authentic, historically-rooted practice is particularly
relevant in debates concerning the imposition of universal standards of
law upon varying cultures. It speaks to the need for culturally grounded
rather than "instant" custom and to the need for an understanding of
natural law and religious doctrine are the "projection of human needs, changing in
response to those needs").
48. Robin West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal
Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145, 152 (1985) ("The natural lawyer's philosophical method,
like the romantic's narrative method, is theoretically pure and willfully counterfactual.
Only moral law is 'true' law. Experience does not ground the theory and method of the
natural law tradition; innocence, faith, and reason do."); see also Robert P. Burns,
Blackstone's Theory of the "Absolute" Rights of Property, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 67 (1985)
(arguing that only in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was there a
sophisticated attempt to integrate the historical foundations of English property rights
with natural law and that this attempt took place in radically distinctive ways); Berman,
supra note 13, at 1655 n.8 (elucidating that most of the multiplicity of contemporary legal
approaches (e.g., law and economics, critical legal studies, and feminist theories) "fall
unconsciously into the positivist category, sometimes with an unconscious admixture of
natural law theory"). In Berman's view, all of these approaches share hostility toward
historical experience as a source of legitimacy. See id.
49. See Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality,
History, 76 CAL. L. REV. 779, 780-82 (1988) (expressing that natural law as traditionally
understood focuses exclusively on the moral groundings of law, to the exclusion of history
and politics).
50. Berman, supra note 13, at 1654.
51. Berman, supra note 49, at 788-789 (tracing the history of the historical school).
52. Berman, supra note 13, at 1655.
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universal rights recognizing that they will be formulated and applied
differently depending on the circumstances and history of the culture
involved. Respect for culture entails respect for history and thereby
supports the classic distinction between natural law, as universal
standards of right conduct, and civil law, as the particular laws of nations
that put those standards into practice under historically and culturally
contingent circumstances.53
A number of thinkers working within the Catholic tradition have
argued that natural law is capable of accounting for and being applied in
a manner consistent with historical circumstance. John Cardinal
Newman, writing in the nineteenth century on the nature of development
in natural law doctrine, argued that ideas develop, not as pure exercises
in logic or additive knowledge, but rather "through and by means of
communities of men and their leaders and guides."55 Newman believed
that history unveils new facts, which fallible individuals and groups then
seek to address in a continuing effort to maintain an accurate and
coherent moral vision.5' Another way of approaching the problem of
natural law's applicability to historically contingent customs and
circumstances is to recognize the necessary role of prudence in applying
general principles to specific circumstances and to recognize the need to
53. See STANLIS, supra note 44, at 7. The author states: "Whereas natural Law came
from God and bound all men, various positive laws and customs were the product of man's
reason and will and applied only to members of particular political communities. This was
the distinction between natural Law and civil laws." Id. The author continues by quoting
Blackstone and Bolingbroke to show that, during Burke's time, an international law
limited in authority to dealings among nations and civil or constitutional laws varying
among peoples were understood as derivatives of the natural law. Id. at 86. For Burke's
description of what Stanlis calls "man's natural moral unity and civil political diversity,"
see id. at 99-100.
54. See Noonan, supra note 47, at 670-71 (citing seventeenth-century Spanish
theologians who believed church teachings would improve over time as the magisterium
worked out the logical implications of Scripture and John Cardinal Newman, who in the
nineteenth century argued that doctrinal development corroborates rather than corrects
its theological sources). Noonan seems to assume that the Catholic Church has actually
changed its views concerning fundamental issues of moral right and wrong, but that issue
is not the subject of this Article. For a telling critique of Noonan's overstatements in this
area, see Patrick M. O'Neil, A Response to John T. Noonan Jr. Concerning the
Development of Catholic Moral Doctrine, FAITH AND REASON, Spring/Summer, 1996, at
59, 79 (arguing that Noonan incorrectly refers to the Church's changes in judgment
regarding circumstances as if they were transformations of morals themselves).
55. See Noonan, supra note 47, at 672.
56. Id.
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understand that prudence dictates favoring historical continuity over
radical change whenever morally possible 7
Philip Hamburger has shown that, during the founding era, Americans
sought to base their constitutions and other civil laws on the natural law;
thus, "they were building upon the medieval tradition that lawmakers
should formulate civil laws in accordance with natural law." '58 Following
natural law was not, however, a matter of simply applying a preset
formula to one's circumstances. Hamburger states:
Not only did Americans tend to consider natural law a
prudential or moral guide rather than a substitute for
constitutional law, but also, typically, they assumed that natural
law did not clearly direct adoption of a particular set of civil
laws. Just as natural law usually was understood to prohibit
injury but not to dictate an individual's choice of noninjurious
actions, so too natural law usually was understood to permit
nations much freedom in forming their constitutions and laws.
Congregational clergymen, who were inclined to emphasize the
breadth of natural law's moral implications and the importance
of natural law as a moral foundation for civil law, acknowledged
that constitutions and other civil laws had to vary according to
circumstance. Such circumstances might require changes over
time as well as from place to place.9
These arguments indicate that natural law is integrative - that it
constitutes an understanding of moral principles that sees them as both
universal and in need of historical and political judgment in their
application. To illustrate and elaborate on this point, the focus of this
Article now shifts to the thoughts of Burke, a statesman, faced with a
57. See Russell Kirk, Natural Law and the Constitution of the United States, 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1035, 1041 (1994). Kirk states:
[N]atural law should not be taken for graven tables of Governance, to be
followed to job and title; such moral law must be appealed to in different
circumstances, and applied with prudence. We must remind ourselves that
natural law is not a kind of inflexible code set up in deliberate opposition to the
positive laws of every state.
Id.
58. Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions,
102 YALE L.J. 907, 937 (1993).
59. Id. at 940-41 (footnotes omitted). Hamburger argues that Americans considered
some rights to be civil, rather than natural, in that they were formed by, and only needed
in, civil government. See id. Burke argues against the applicability of any state of nature
to civil government or to the formulation of natural rights. Some rights, such as due
process rights, are both civil - in that they are formed by civil government - and natural -
in that any government failing to provide them violates natural law. What saves this
position from self-contradiction is the conviction that civil society is man's natural state.
See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
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deep conflict of cultures, who sought to integrate historical, moral, and
political principles so as to support universal rights as well as the rights of
indigenous people to respect, follow, and enrich their own traditions.
Burke wrote during a time when Britain's empire was achieving
worldwide scope and its political system faltered under the weight of self-60
governance. At a time when faith in Great Britain's imperial mission
had not fully taken shape or solidified its hostility toward indigenous
peoples, Burke sought to champion the rights of preexisting cultures and
traditions.6" Best known for his attacks on the radical innovations of the• 62
Jacobin rulers in revolutionary France, Burke actually spent the bulk of
his career defending colonial groups against what he believed were
unjust policies imposed by Parliament, of which he was a member.61 Of
Irish birth, Burke opposed Britain's laws against Catholics and against
the Catholic religion in Ireland. 64 Well-known in his youth as a defender
of the chartered rights of American colonists, Burke later sought to
revoke the charter of the British East India Company, which he charged
had oppressed the people of India.65 As a life-long supporter of inherited
aristocratic privilege, he also devoted considerable energies to ending the
60. See JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED
STATES 1607-1788, ix-xii (1986) (addressing the problems created by governing large
territories under a confederated form of government).
61. See FREDERICK G. WHELAN, EDMUND BURKE AND INDIA: POLITICAL
MORALITY AND EMPIRE 19 (1996) (explaining that, in the eighteenth century, "the almost
unquestioningly positive imperialist spirit we associate with the Victorian empire was a
thing of the future").
62. See Jerry Z. Muller, Introduction to Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution
in France, in CONSERVATISM: AN ANTHOLOGY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT
FROM DAVID HUME TO THE PRESENT 78-80 (Jerry Z. Muller ed., 1997).
63. See EMPIRE AND COMMUNITY: EDMUND BURKE'S WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 8-29 (David P. Fidler & Jennifer M. Welsh eds., 1999)
(detailing Burke's involvement in issues concerning colonial treatment of the Irish,
Americans, and Indians).
64. See Conor Cruise O'Brien, Introduction to EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON
THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 41 (1968) ("The author of the Reflections... wrote in the
persona of an Englishman... but was in fact Irish to the marrow of his bones."). On the
importance of Burke's Irish parentage, see CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN, THE GREAT
MELODY: A THEMATIC BIOGRAPHY AND COMMENTED ANTHOLOGY OF EDMUND
BURKE 3-11 (1992).
65. See, e.g., FRANCIS CANAVAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EDMUND BURKE:
THE ROLE OF PROPERTY IN HIS WORK 72-73 (1995) (describing Burke's appeal to the
natural rights of the people of India, rather than to the chartered rights of the company, in
opposing the East India Company's actions); see also STANLIS, supra note 44, at 59-60
(expressing Burke's view that unlike the Magna Charta, the East India Company's charter
was a grant of power, and that by abusing that power, the company in effect forfeited its
right to it).
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inherited practice of slavery, even writing a slave code intended to phase
out slavery and face the inevitable cultural upheavals emancipation
would bring.66 Burke offers an example of jurisprudence in which the
ethical norms of natural law apply to all humankind. 67  These norms
demand recognition of a short list of fundamental rights - principally
the right to stability, to the support of one's accustomed institutions, to
respect for prescriptive property rights and the rights of the family, and
to due process of law."" These norms, according to Burke, also demand a
civil government that is responsive to the contingencies of circumstance
69and history.
This Article will discuss the historical element in Burke's
jurisprudence, building on his sketch of a history of the English common
law through a discussion of his views concerning the duty to maintain
cultural continuity. This Article then turns to the moral element in
Burke's jurisprudence, concentrating on its most powerful expressions:
his opposition to English laws punishing Irish Catholics for their religion
and his opposition to any morally relativist judging of British conduct in
India. Next, this Article turns to Burke's criticism of the East India
Company's failure to translate the principles of natural law into
appropriate political practice. This Article then highlights Burke's
critique of Warren Hastings' conduct as Governor General of India,
which focused on the proper limits of colonial power and the nature of
the rights reserved even by conquered peoples. Finally, this Article will
demonstrate the manner in which Burke sought to manage the need to
eliminate slavery, which was both in violation of natural law and deeply
ingrained in the relevant cultures.
66. See EDMUND BURKE, Sketch of a Negro Code, in 5 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT
HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 524-44 (Bohn ed., 1854) [hereinafter 5 BURKE, Negro
Code] (detailing rules for the treatment of slaves and emphasizing their education during a
proposed period of gradual emancipation). For Burke's views on the limits of the
aristocracy's claim to wield unquestioned power, see EDMUND BURKE, Letter to a Noble
Lord, in 5 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 114 (Bohn ed.,
1854) [hereinafter 5 BURKE, Letter] (explaining his objections to noble judges).
67. See, e.g., 5 BURKE, Negro Code, supra note 66, at 525 (explaining the application
of true religious and moral principles to all "men").
68. See, e.g., 5 BURKE, Letter, supra note 66, at 116 (explaining English "survival" of
the French Revolution).
69. See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in 2 THE
WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 295 (Bohn ed., 1854)
[hereinafter 2 BURKE, Reflections] (reflecting that a state must adapt to survive).
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HISTORY AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
Common law was deeply ingrained in the theory and practice of law in
Burke's Great Britain."' Moreover, it was to a common law
understanding of rights - of their reformulation over time in accordance
with the needs and circumstances of those affected by them - that Burke
looked in seeking to protect and apply rights in varying cultures and
political contexts.7" Indeed, a primary reason for Burke's refusal to
practice law, even after having satisfied the residential qualifications for
the Irish Bar, was his dissatisfaction with what he deemed the ahistorical
nature of legal training and practice in Great Britain." According to
Burke, English lawyers had wholly failed to grasp the importance of
history and "historical jurisprudence" in understanding the practice of
English law.73 Thus, the lawyers of Burke's time had failed to grasp the
true ground of people's rights in the application of general norms to
particular circumstances. According to Burke, in Britain:
the law has been confined, and drawn up into a narrow and
inglorious study; and that which should be the leading science in
every well-ordered commonwealth, remained in all the
barbarism of the rudest times. . . . [T]he study of our
jurisprudence presented to liberal and well-educated minds,
even in the best authors, hardly anything but barbarous terms,
ill explained; a coarse but not a plain expression, an indigested
method, and a species of reasoning, the very refuse of the
schools; which deduced the spirit of the law, not from original
justice or legal conformity, but from causes foreign to it, and
altogether whimsical."
The primitive state of legal studies in Burke's Britain prevented
lawyers from defining and refining legal terms to find the spirit of the law
in "original" principles of justice. 5 This methodological failure kept
70. See EDMUND BURKE, An Abridgment of English History, in 6 THE WORKS OF
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 412-14 (Bohn ed., 1854) (explaining the
importance of the history of canon law).
71. See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, Articles of Charge Against Warren Hastings, in 4 THE
WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 276 (Bohn ed., 1854)
[hereinafter 4 BURKE, Articles of Charge] (charging Hastings with a common law violation
for his actions with the Benares).
72. See Ian Crowe, Under God and Law?, 40 UNIVERSITY BOOKMAN 3, 49 (2000)
(discussing Burke's attitude toward the study of law in the England of his time).
73. EDMUND BURKE, Essay Towards a History of the Laws of England, in 6 THE
WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 413 (Bohn ed., 1854)
[hereinafter 6 BURKE, History of the Laws].
74. Id. at 414.
75. See id.
2002]
Catholic University Law Review
English lawyers from forming the integrative view of jurisprudence that
Burke advocates, even in his early and fragmentary "Essay Towards a
History of the Laws of England. 76 In that fragment, Burke notes that
"[t]here is scarce any object of curiosity more rational, than the origin,
the progress, and the various revolutions of human laws., 77  The
historical progress of laws, punctuated by political revolutions and their
effects, appeals to human reason - the source of our ability to discern
natural law.7" Thus, a student of law, such as Burke, might seek to pen an
account of the moral justice of humankind in its attempt "to imitate the
Supreme Ruler in one of the most glorious of his attributes" through
lawmaking.79
For Burke, understanding historical circumstance is key to moral
conduct; only through such understanding can humankind discern what is
appropriate in the name of justice under given conditions." Law's
organic natural capacity for growth and reformation over time means
that it must be treated with care rather than undergo experimentation in
pursuit of abstract goals such as uniformity. Because law embodies the
corporate wisdom of the people developed over time, respect for the
people's rights demands an attitude of reverence for the historically
rooted, and therefore, tried and true political institutions and traditions
handed down over the generations." History, then, is intimately bound
76. Id. Of the continuing importance of this fragment for understanding Burke,
Crowe writes:
The few paragraphs that comprise this Essay, though, offer much more than an
apology for a change of career. The reconciling of continuity and change, of the
ancient and the modern, became a central thread in Burke's political philosophy,
and Burke's brief critique of legal history contains reflections on the relationship
between law, society and government that can be traced forward essentially
unchanged through his writings on the Popery laws in Ireland to his attacks on
Warren Hastings and on Jacobinism.
Crowe, supra note 72, at 49-50.
77. 6 BURKE, History of the Laws, supra note 73, at 412.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. A detailed discussion of the role of history in Burke's theory of virtue and
prudential statesmanship can be found in BRUCE P. FROHNEN, VIRTUE AND THE
PROMISE OF CONSERVATISM: THE LEGACY OF BURKE AND TOCQUEVILLE 42-89 (1993).
81. See id.; see also RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO
ELIOT 120-121 (7th ed. 1986) (arguing that law is capable of growth and self-correction but
must not be disturbed through wholesale, radical reform lest individual rights and the
fabric of society suffer).
82. See STANLIS, supra note 44, at 53 (discussing Burke's opposition to claims that
personal representation is a natural right based on the apprehension that those who
mistake civil rights for universal natural rights end up viewing all existing governments as
usurpations, thus undermining the legitimacy of these governments).
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up with morals and politics and with the proper understanding of law.
Unfortunately, in Burke's view, English jurisprudence failed in its
essential task of explicating history and its implications. 3 For example,
Burke stated that Lord Chief Justice Hale's History of the Common Law,
the only "undertaking" of historical jurisprudence then existing, was
inadequate:
The sources of our English law are not well, nor indeed fairly,
laid open; the ancient judicial proceedings are touched in a very
slight and transient manner; and the great changes and
remarkable revolutions in the law, together with their causes...
are scarcely mentioned.84
Burke argued that English lawyers lacked a historical understanding of
the law because of two unfortunate misunderstandings: first, that English
law had remained unchanged over the centuries, and second, that no
foreign sources had any significant impact on that unchanging English
law."' These mistaken opinions arose from a refusal to recognize that law
develops over time, improving through the forces of reason and
experience as well as through its own internal logic. 86 According to
Burke, the law must be learned through its history,
[flor what can be more instructive than to search out the first
obscure and scanty fountains of that jurisprudence, which now
waters and enriches whole nations with so abundant and
copious a flood:-to observe the first principles of RIGHT
springing up, involved in superstition, and polluted with
violence; until by length of time, and favourable circumstances,
it has worked itself into clearness:-the laws, sometimes lost
and trodden down in the confusion of wars and tumults, and
sometimes overruled by the hand of power; then victorious over
tyranny, growing stronger, clearer, and more decisive by the
violence they had suffered; enriched even by those foreign
conquests which threatened their entire destruction; softened
and mellowed by peace and religion, improved and exalted by
commerce, by social intercourse, and that great opener of the
mind, ingenuous science?87
Overlooking this story of the development of English liberties, English
lawyers fell into potentially disastrous mistakes.88  Their refusal to
83. See 6 BURKE, History of the Laws, supra note 73, at 413.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 413-14.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 413.
88. See id. at 415.
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consider the evidence of history led lawyers to accept two views equally
dangerous to English liberties: the first, that English liberties are in fact
mere grants from the conquering Norman king, and thus revocable at his
will; and the second, that the long line of victories won for liberty in
documents such as the Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights are
irrelevant because these documents merely restate historical practice.89
This latter error would leave important victories, and the documents in
which they were recorded, undefended in times of trouble and potential
tyranny.90 Both errors unveiled the danger to political liberty posed by
historical ignorance.
Contrary to the unchanging, impregnable fortress so many English
lawyers saw as their law, Burke argued for a nuanced understanding of
the historical influences shaping the English legal tradition, stating:
[T]he present system of our laws, like our language and our
learning, is a very mixed and heterogeneous mass; in some
respects our own; in more borrowed from the policy of foreign
nations, and compounded, altered, and variously modified,
according to the various necessities, which the manners, the
religion, and the commerce of the people have at different times
imposed. 9'
Such impositions began at an early date and, in Burke's telling, formed
a story of legal development.9 In addition to writing down the customs
of the people, the Saxon kings, under the influence of missionary clerics,
had abrogated some of their more "odious" customs, spelled out others,
and added a number of provisions with their sources in civil and canon
law.93 Through this process, "there is no appearance of a regular,
consistent, and stable jurisprudence. However, it is pleasing to observe
something of equity and distinction gradually insinuating itself into these
unformed materials" chiefly through clerical influence.94
Thus, even before the Norman Conquest fundamentally changed
English law, that law was in fact a combination of at least three sources:
the customs of the Germanic inhabitants, the "canons of the church...
[which] corrected, mitigated, and enriched those rough northern
89. Id.; see also 2 BURKE, Reflections, supra note 69, at 294-96 (reasoning that Britain
owed its liberties to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 not because of new ideas then
propagated, but because reason and experience showed the people the need to confine the
royal prerogative even further than before in order to protect inherited freedoms).
90. 6 BURKE, History of the Laws, supra note 73, at 415.
91. Id. at 416.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 420.
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institutions... [and] some parts of the Roman civil law, and the customs
of other German nations."95  The role of the clergy is particularly
important in Burke's view because of its long-term role in shaping the
people and their law: "the clergy having once bent the stubborn necks of
that people to the yoke of religion, they were the more easily susceptible
of other changes introduced under the same sanction." 96 In Burke's
fragmentary history of English law, we have a theory of legal
development that acknowledges the role of history and the cumulative
effect of cultural change. As the effects of one change are absorbed by
the people, the resulting change in the people's character makes them
more receptive to further changes; in this case, further refinements and
reforms make the laws they had inherited more just.
Burke's view of history, however, is not a tale of the triumph of
modern justice over more primitive customs. Rather, for Burke, history
has its own logic and prescriptive power; it is the source of current
freedoms and the repository of lasting wisdom, most particularly
concerning the character of the people to be governed. 97 In part, Burke's
historical jurisprudence rests on simple prudence. According to Burke,
the English are right to be "afraid to put men to live and trade each on
his own private stock of reason[] because we suspect that this stock in
each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail
themselves of the general bond and capital of nations and of ages." 98
The wisdom of experience is of particular importance for Burke because
it embodies changes in the character of nations and peoples that develops
over time.99 Society is produced by convention, and "[i]f civil society be
the offspring of convention, that convention must be its law."'' This
convention - over time - creates prescriptive rights based on rational
expectations that in turn are based on particular social habits and
traditions. It was these culturally rooted rights that Burke defended in
opposition to abstract, ahistorical notions of universal rights, such as
those put forward by the French revolutionary Jacobins.'0 '
Institutions, public practices, and even rights must be appropriate to
the historically grounded culture and character of the people involved. 2
95. Id. at 421-22.
96. Id. at 421.
97. Id. at 412-13.
98. 2 BURKE, Reflections, supra note 69, at 359.
99. See 6 BURKE, History of the Laws, supra note 73, at 412-13.
100. 2 BURKE, Reflections, supra note 69, at 332.
101. See KIRK, supra note 81, at 40-43.
102. See 6 BURKE, History of the Laws, supra note 73, at 416.
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Conceiving of society as a compact among generations, Burke saw the
real rights of men as bound by culture and embodied in institutions,
beliefs, and practices developed over time. 1°3  No one person or
generation has a right to radically alter these cultural legacies, as the
result might well be disaster for generations to come. Borrowing from
property law, Burke paints the generation currently possessed of cultural
and political power as mere life-tenants, bound to preserve the value of
their inheritance for succeeding generations:
[O]ne of the first and most leading principles on which the
commonwealth and the laws are consecrated, is lest the
temporary possessors and life-renters in it, unmindful of what
they have received from their ancestors, or of what is due to
their posterity, should act as if they were the entire masters; that
they should not think it among their rights to cut off the entail,
or commit waste on the inheritance, by destroying at their
pleasure the whole original fabric of their society.
More generally, Burke brings a common law understanding of legal
and cultural development to discussions of human rights. He saw it as
the duty of lawyers and statesmen to defend the rational expectations of
the people in regard to legal rules and their treatment by public
authorities. Burke wrote within a tradition perhaps best known in
America through the writings of William Blackstone. Blackstone
differentiated the common law from the civil law, which "the emperor
had once determined was to serve for a guide for the future."'' 5 Under
the common law, contrawise, people looked to decisions of courts of
justice as evidence of the law, whereas the judges themselves looked to
precedent and customary practice in deciding particular controversies.' 6
Unlike the French Jacobins, who sought to remake society in
accordance with abstract human rights, Burke argued that society is
bound together by various traditions and conventions that must be
nurtured if any decent life is to be possible.0 7 Law and legislation, in this
103. Id.
104. 2 BURKE, Reflections, supra note 69, at 366-67.
105. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *71.
106. Id. at *71-73. Of course, judicial decisions were not wholly self-justifying. See id.
at *69. Blackstone also spoke of the duty to maintain and expound upon existing law,
rather than pronouncing new law, except "where the former determination is most
evidently contrary to reason; much more if it be clearly contrary to the divine law." Id. at
*69-70.
107. See 2 BURKE, Reflections, supra note 69, at 282. (reflecting on the destructive
capacity of abstract principles and likening the French revolutionaries to madmen who,
having escaped wholesome detention, would set about destroying concrete institutions in
the name of abstract principles).
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view, must be ruled by prudence and aimed at preserving social peace
and cultural continuity. Burke stated:
The science of government being therefore so practical in itself,
and intended for such practical purposes, a matter which
requires experience, and even more experience than any person
can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and observing he
may be, it is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture
upon pulling down an edifice, which has answered in any
tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or on
building it up again, without having models and patterns of
approved utility before his eyes.108
What, then, of rights? Clearly for Burke we may not usefully talk of
abstract rights without reference to historical circumstances. In
particular, the natural rights of pre-social and pre-historical man may
mislead us in our political pursuits.'09 According to Burke,
in the gross and complicated mass of human passions and
concerns, the primitive rights of men undergo such a variety of
refractions and reflections, that it becomes absurd to talk of
them as if they continued in the simplicity of their original
direction. The nature of man is intricate; the objects of society
are of the greatest possible complexity: and therefore no simple
disposition or direction of power can be suitable either to man's
nature, or to the quality of his affairs. "
Forms of government and even political rights must vary according to
circumstance and history."' In addition to man's primary nature, Burke
argues that man has a second nature formed by historical
circumstances. " ' Thus, in Burke's view, wise legislators in ancient times
recognized that they
were obliged to study the effects of those habits which are
communicated by the circumstances of civil life. They were
sensible that the operation of this second nature on the first
produced a new combination, and thence arose many diversities
amongst men, according to their birth, their education, their
professions, the periods of their lives, their residence in towns
or in the country, their several ways of acquiring and of fixing
property, and according to the quality of the property itself, all
108. Id. at 334.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. See STANLIS, supra note 44, at 53 (illustrating that, according to Burke, the right
to representation is properly conditioned by the nature and needs of one's political
society).
112. 2 BURKE, Reflections, supra note 69, at 454.
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which rendered them, as it were so many different species of
animals.' 13
Such differing species could not all be treated with absolute equality; in
any prudent society, people would be treated, not equally, but fittingly -
according to each person's character and needs - and it was each
person's right to be so treated."' Particular rights would vary among
them, but this does not mean that, for Burke, there are no "real" human
rights, or permanent standards by which to judge the conduct of political
rulers. To the contrary, Burke maintained:
Far am I from denying in theory, full as far is my heart from
withholding in practice. . . the real rights of men. . . . [C]ivil
society.., is an institution of beneficence; and law itself is only
beneficence acting by a rule. Men have a right to live by that
rule; they have a right to do justice, as between their fellows,
whether their fellows are in public function or in ordinary
occupation. They have a right to the fruits of their industry; and
to the means of making their industry fruitful. They have a
right to the acquisitions of their parents; to the nourishment and
improvement of their offspring; to instruction in life, and to
consolation in death.'
1 5
The real rights of man, in Burke's view, are practical. They include the
right to do justice through participation in a predictable legal system, to
make an honest living through one's own labors, to enjoy the goods of
family life, and to experience solace in death."6 Stated as generalities,
these rights do not entitle particular people to specific objects."7 Rather,
history and custom endow Burke's rights with form and context. These
rights set out the principal goods of life - religion, family, property, and
due process of law - and leave the particulars of liturgy, ancestry,
occupation, and judicial culture to the workings of tradition and
circumstance.
Burke asserted that reason should be used in pursuit of moderate
improvements in society."8 Even reason must bow to tradition, however,
113. Id.
114. See id. at 455.
115. Id. at 331-32.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See EDMUND BURKE, Speech on Economical Reform, in 2 THE WORKS OF THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 65 (Bohn ed., 1854) (maintaining that reforms




for the expectations of tradition create prescriptive rights."' Each of us,
according to Burke, has a right to be treated as we always have been
treated; to a life stable on public, private, and social fronts; to a life in
which historical continuity is strong and change is restricted by
recognition of the need to avoid radical influences; and to a life in which
rights are secure and valued as prescriptive and as a historical
inheritance. Burke maintained:
Our oldest reformation is that of Magna Charta. You will see
that Sir Edward Coke, that great oracle of our law, and indeed
all the great men who follow him, to Blackstone, are industrious
to prove the pedigree of our liberties. They endeavor to prove
that the ancient charter, the Magna Charta of King John, was
connected with another positive charter from Henry I., and that
both the one and the other were nothing more than a re-
affirmance of the still more ancient standing law of the
kingdom. In the matter of fact, for the greater part, these
authors appear to be in the right; perhaps not always; but if the
lawyers mistake in some particulars, it proves my position still
the more strongly; because it demonstrates the powerful
prepossession towards antiquity, with which the minds of all our
lawyers and legislators, and of all the people whom they wish to
influence, have been always filled; and the stationary policy of
this kingdom in considering their most sacred rights and
franchises as an inheritance.120
BURKEAN HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATURAL LAW
In Burke's view, social and cultural stability are necessary to protect
people's expectations and ability to plan for the future - both of which
Burke deems so critical as to be natural rights. 21 The shape and content
of particular rights should be formed by tradition.122 A right remains
119. See, e.g., CANAVAN, supra note 65, at 60 (acknowledging that Burke would have
agreed with William Warburton's definition of prescription: "when a Man, by enjoying for
a certain Course of Time without Opposition, the Property of another, but possessed by
him bona fide and by a lawful title acquires in that others Property, a full Right").
Canavan continues that, for Burke, prescription is "a principle of the law of nature" that
aims to secure people's "natural well-meaning ignorance" and to secure property rights
"by the best of all principles, continuance." Id. at 62.
120. 2 BURKE, Reflections, supra note 69, at 305 (footnote omitted).
121. See CANAVAN, supra note 65, at 73; see also EDMUND BURKE, Tract on the
Popery Laws, in 6 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 32 (Bohn
ed., 1854) [hereinafter 6 BURKE, Popery Laws] ("[Y]ou punish [Catholics in Ireland] for
acting upon a principle which of all others is perhaps the most necessary for preserving
society, an implicit admiration and adherence to the establishments of their forefathers.").
122. See 6 BURKE, Popery Laws, supra note 121, at 32.
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"natural," in Burke's view, if the right is respected everywhere.' 23  As
with natural law itself, Burkean rights are rooted in "moral principles
that are derived ultimately from reason and conscience.'
24
Concerned as he was to defend people's expectations, particularly in
terms of the laws by which they were governed, Burke counseled against
wholesale reforms unless the law in question contradicted "the nature
and end of law itself.' 2' Regardless, a law that is considered an offense
"against common right and the ends of just government" and goes "to
the root and principle of the laws" is not merely ill-considered; it is "void
in its obligatory quality on the mind, and therefore ... the proper object
of abrogation and repeal.' ' 126  For Burke, following the natural law
tradition, a truly bad law is not a law, but an abuse.
127
In Burke's view, laws against Catholicism in Ireland were examples of
such an abuse. In order to encourage conversion from Catholicism to
Britain's established Church of Ireland, the popery laws sought "wholly
to change the course of descent by the common law; to take away the
right of primogeniture," the right of fathers to control their sons'
inheritance until their own deaths and the right to dispense money
through marriage. 2  These laws also imposed various economic and
professional disabilities on Catholics and denied them access to
education and various due process rights accorded to Protestants. 29 The
123. See id.
124. Berman, supra note 13, at 1653; see also STANLIS, supra note 44, at 232 ("Burke
conceived of the Natural Law as an ethical norm by which to judge the social and political
behavior of men.").
125. 6 BURKE, Popery Laws, supra note 121, at 19.
126. Id. at 19-20.
127. See, e.g., GRATIAN, THE TREATISE ON LAWS, DECRETUM DD. 1-20, WITH THE
ORDINARY GLOSS 25 (Augustine Thompson & James Gordley trans., 1993) (arguing that
natural law possesses greater dignity than other laws and that "no one is permitted to act
contrary to natural law"). Gratian continued: "The ordinances of princes should not
prevail over natural law ... whoever refuses to obey imperial ordinances made contrary to
God's truth receives abundant reward." Id. at 29 (citations omitted); see also 2 CICERO,
LAWS, in THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS: SELECTED READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE
51 (Clarence Morris ed., 1997). Cicero explained:
What of the many deadly, the many pestilential statutes which nations put in
force? These no more deserve to be called laws than the rules a band of robbers
might pass in their assembly .... [T]herefore Law is the distinction between
things just and unjust, made in agreement with that primal and most ancient of
all things, Nature; and in conformity to Nature's standard are framed those
human laws which inflict punishment upon the wicked but defend and protect
the good.
Id.
128. 6 BURKE, Popery Laws, supra note 121, at 7.
129. See id. at 13-18.
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laws aimed to convert Catholics by punishing them for their faith, as the
laws were designed to give preference to Protestants over Catholics in
the recognition and distribution of basic social goods. 30 In Burke's view,
the popery laws were not truly laws because "[p]artiality and law are
contradictory terms.'' 3  According to Burke, "the essence of law"
requires that particular laws be made "as much as possible for the benefit
of the whole" rather than one particular faction, such as the Protestants
in - what was after all - an overwhelmingly Catholic country.'32 The
popery laws, in aiming to punish most Irish people, amounted to abuse of
the natural law. Burke further explained:
A law against the majority of the people is in substance a law
against the people itself; its extent determines its invalidity; it
even changes its character as it enlarges its operation: it is not
particular injustice, but general oppression; and can no longer
be considered as a private hardship, which might be borne, but
spreads and grows up into the unfortunate importance of a
national calamity.'33
Here lies the root of Burke's historical vision of natural law;
communities - people with their own customs and culture - grow over
time. Not even a democratic majority has the
right to make a law prejudicial to the whole community . . .
because it would be made against the principle of a superior
law, which it is not in the power of any community, or of the
whole race of man to alter ... I mean the will of Him who gave
us our nature, and in giving impressed an invariable law upon it.
It would be hard to point out any error more truly subversive of
all the order and beauty, of all the peace and happiness, of
human society, than the position that any body of men have a
right to make what laws they please; or that laws can derive any
authority from their institution merely and independent of the
quality of the subject-matter.
If not on the will of the majority, then on what ought law be based?
Burke argues that the only proper foundations of law are "equity and
utility." ' Burke defined "equity" in terms of natural justice and "utility"
130. See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe, in 3 THE WORKS OF
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 300-301 (Bohn ed., 1854) (explaining that
the "declared object [of the popery laws] was to reduce the Catholics of Ireland to a
miserable populace, without property, without estimation, without education").
131. 6 BURKE, Popery Laws, supra note 121, at 23.
132. Id. at 22-23.
133. Id. at 20.
134. Id. at 21.
135. Id. at 22.
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in terms of the common good. Equity "grows out of the great rule of
equality, which is grounded upon our common nature." '136 As "the
Mother of Justice," equity demands that all of us be accorded our
fundamental rights.'37 Laws that give form to these rights must vary in
accord with circumstance,'38 but "[a]ll human laws are, properly speaking,
only declaratory; they may alter the mode and application, but have no
power over the substance of original justice."'39 Equity demands that our
common rights based in our common nature be respected, and that our
second nature, formed through inculcation into a particular society, be
respected as well. 40 As for utility, it "must be understood, not of partial
or limited, but of general and public utility ... for any other utility may
be the utility of a robber, but cannot be that of a citizen; the interest of
the domestic enemy, and not that of a member of the commonwealth.'
41
Ruler and ruled alike must enact and obey laws seeking the good of the
nation as a whole.1 42 Burke does not construct a blueprint regarding what
particular policies each nation should follow; instead, he recommends a
general course of action, leaving it to the prudence of rulers and to those
ruled to choose wisely in particular circumstances. Burke maintained,
however, that "a constitution against the interest of the many is rather of
the nature of a grievance than of a law . . . All governors, Burke
asserted, have a duty to seek the public good while respecting the rights
of all.
44
Peter Stanlis notes that for Burke:
Civil society, patterned upon nature, man, and historical







142. See THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW 96 (Ralph McInerny ed., 1998)
(explaining that laws are just when "they are ordained to the common good," when the
law "does not exceed the power of the lawgiver," and when "burdens are laid on the
subjects according to an equality of proportion and with a view to the common good").
One might also note the historical element in Aquinas' formulation: unjust laws do not
bind in conscience "except perhaps in order to avoid scandal or disturbance" or when
disobedience would inflict "a more grievous hurt." Id. The concern for preventing both
disturbance and "more grievous hurt" would seem to indicate a concern to protect the
order and continuity of society. Id.
1,43. 6 BURKE, Popery Laws, supra note 121, at 28.
144. See 2 BURKE, Reflections, supra note 69, at 399-401 (positing that a government's
effects on a nation can be measured according to the state of that nation's population and
wealth - good policies will increase both and bad policies will decrease both).
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conditions and circumstances to shape its character as physical
nature, and therefore nations are governed not by any abstract
universal and eternal principles derived directly from Natural
law, but indirectly, through man's corporate reason and free
will, through the conditional forms of government."'
While it is necessary for civil governments to reform in the face of
changing circumstances, there are ethical norms by which to judge each
nation's conduct. According to Burke, "national constitutions modify
the method of application, but they do not extinguish or even weaken the
power of Natural Law.'
146
A central question of Burkean jurisprudence, and arguably of natural
law jurisprudence as a whole, concerns how one can square the idea of
universal rights with the particular customs and traditions of specific
cultures. The key, for Burke, is the conviction that one does not have a
natural right to a particular form of government or society. It is
necessary for civil societies to develop their own unique structure so as to
meet their particular circumstances while maintaining themselves, their
people, and their people's natural rights. Burke argues, "If civil society
be the offspring of convention, that convention must be its law. That
convention must limit and modify all the descriptions of constitution
which are formed under it. Every sort of legislative, judicial, or
executory power are its creatures."'47 Natural rights themselves are a
check on any "right" to absolute sovereignty, even of the majority; thus,
"[g]overnment is not made in virtue of natural rights, which may and do
exist in total independence of it . ... 14 That is, government concerns
the distribution of political power, and while the government itself must
not trample the real rights of men, the distribution of its powers is a
matter of convention, not of right.
49
Because Burke rejected the notion of a pre-civil "state of nature" in
which all humans enjoyed absolute equality and rights, he saw civil
society, itself, as the protector of fundamental rights, interpreted to fit
the circumstances of place and time.5 In particular, Burke rejected the
French Revolutionary notion, embodied in the Declaration of the Rights
of Man, "that all men are by nature free, are equal in respect of rights,
145. STANLIS, supra note 44, at 99-100.
146. Id. at 100.
147. 2 BURKE, Reflections, supra note 69, at 332.
148. Id. at 332-33.
149. See id. at 332.
150. STANLIS, supra note 44, at 129-30 (citing Burke's rejection of the natural rights
language of English and French revolutionaries).
2002]
Catholic University Law Review
and continue so in society.'' t ' Such convictions, in Burke's view, would
result in the destruction of any society because no concrete actual set of
institutions could maintain absolute equality and freedom.
15 2
Natural rights must protect the continuity and integrity of the
particular culture concerned. To make this point clear, this Article turns
next to Burke's defense of the rights of the people of India. Distance,
differences in language and culture, and economic concerns produced
great difficulty for Britain's "attempt[ ] to govern India at all .... But
there we are; there we are placed by the Sovereign Disposer: and we
must do the best we can in our situation."'53 Although Burke possessed a
distaste for colonial power, he sought to utilize this power as wisely as
possible. As P.J. Marshall has argued, "[e]ven if the British had acquired
their superiority [in India] by 'fraud or force, or whether by a mixture of
both,' duties inescapably followed."'54 These duties, however, did not
include forcing India to become a semblance of Britain or Britain's
American colonies in its government or culture. Burke noted:
I never was wild enough.., to conceive, that one method would
serve for the whole; I could never conceive that the natives of
Hindostan and those of Virginia could be ordered in the same
manner; or that the Cutchery Court and the Grand Jury of
Salem could be regulated on a similar plan.55
India was neither Britain nor America. It had to be governed in a
manner appropriate to its circumstances and in accordance with natural
law. Burke castigated the East India Company, and its director, Warren
Hastings, for putting forth the idea of a merely "geographical" morality.
The notion that Hastings was forced by the character of the Indian
peoples to use tyrannous methods of rule was corrupting, not only of
government in India, but of the morals of anyone who would accept such
a notion."' All human law, in Burke's view, derives from a higher,
natural law. The legal systems of Asia, no less than those of Europe,
were aimed at the good of their people. Thus, it was wrong to speak as if
Asian cultures were inherently slavish and governable only by "oriental
151. See id. (quoting Burke's statements regarding the incompatibility of natural rights
and the civil state).
152. Id. at 130.
153. P.J. MARSHALL, Burke and India, in THE ENDURING EDMUND BURKE:
BICENTENNIAL ESSAYS 43 (Ian Crowe ed., 1997).
154. Id.
155. See id. at 41.
156. EDMUND BURKE, Speech on the Impeachment of Warren Hastings, Esq. Fourth
Day, in 7 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 93-94 (Bohn ed.,
1854) [hereinafter 7 BURKE, Speech on the Impeachment].
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despotism." Burke challenged "the whole race of man to show me any of
the Oriental governors claiming to themselves a right to act by arbitrary
will."'57 The people of India, in particular, developed a great civilization
worthy of respect from other nations, including the English, who
happened to be in a position of authority over them at that time.
Throughout its long history, according to Burke, India's traditions made
"'a people happy and a government flourishing' under 'the paternal,
lenient, protecting arm of a native government. ' '' .9 Seeing past the many
cultural differences Hastings had emphasized, Burke compared the
nobility of India with that of Germany and did not find India's nobility
wanting in moral or political rectitude.' 60 More generally, in discussing
the nations of Asia, Burke asserted that "their morality is equal to ours
as regards the morality of governors, fathers, superiors; and I challenge
the world to show, in any modern European book, more true morality
and wisdom than is to be found in the writings of Asiatic men in high
trusts.
, 161
POLITICAL PRUDENCE AND NATURAL LAW
Indians, Burke asserted, like Britons, had natural rights that deserved
protection - rights that Hastings had violated.'62 In discussing the
Company's charter from the crown, Burke freely admitted the company's
claim to administer an annual territorial revenue of seven
millions sterling; to command an army of sixty thousand men;
and to dispose (under the control of a sovereign, imperial
discretion and with the due observance of the natural and local
law) of the lives and fortunes of thirty millions of their fellow-
creatures.
16 3
However, the company evaded any exercise of Parliament's imperial
discretion and ignored its duty to observe the natural and local law.'
64
157. See MARSHALL, supra note 153, at 43 (quoting 7 BURKE, Speech on
Impeachment, supra note 156, at 105).
158. See id.
159. Id. at 42.
160. See id. at 41.
161. Id. at 43.
162. See id.
163. EDMUND BURKE, Speech on Mr. Fox's East-India Bill, in 2 THE WORKS OF THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 177 (Bohn ed., 1854) [hereinafter 2 BURKE,
East-India].
164. Id. at 224-25 (reporting that Burke accused Hastings of conducting a "revolution"
against the "constitution" of the East India Company by removing any effective oversight
of Hastings' actions, including elimination of dissents to company decisions that might be
read by Parliament).
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First, Hastings had failed to provide fair and impartial trials for Indians
under his political control or to provide accused Indians with the
requisite specificity of charges necessary to meet natural law standards of
due process.'65 Second, Hastings abused his right to make war and66
peace. In fact, his company "never has made a treaty which they have
not broken.' ' 67  Lastly, Hastings and the company had destroyed the
landed interest and the public foundations that once provided public
works for the province of Bengal.
6
8
Bribery, extortion, false charges, denial of due process, and the
intentional undermining of local institutions and laws characterized
Hastings' rule. 69  Through these actions, Hastings forfeited the
company's charter of special rights from the crown because such charters
established a trust, "and it is of the very essence of every trust to be
rendered accountable; and even totally to cease, when it substantially
varies from the purposes for which alone it could have a lawful
existence."' 7  In acceding to the East India Company's charter,
Parliament had entered into a contract with it. Burke stated that, "if the
abuse [by the Company] is proved, the contract is broken; and we re-
enter into all our rights; that is, into the exercise of all our duties.''.
Parliament had a duty to protect all peoples in its empire, and this duty
superceded any corporate charter.72 Unlike the Magna Charta, "a
charter to restrain power, and to destroy monopoly[, t]he East-India
charter is a charter to establish monopoly, and to create power. Political
power and commercial monopoly are not the rights of men . ,,173 The
165. 4 BURKE, Articles of Charge, supra note 71, at 260, 258; see also 2 BURKE, East-
India, supra note 163, at 208 ("[S]upposing the Rajah of Benares to be a mere subject, and
that subject a criminal of the highest form; let us see what course was taken by an upright
English magistrate. Did he cite his culprit before his tribunal? Did he make a charge?
Did he produce witnesses? These are not forms; they are parts of substantial and eternal
justice.").
166. See 2 BURKE, East-India, supra note 163, at 192.
167. See id. at 186.
168. See id. at 220-22.
169. See generally 4 BURKE, Articles of Charge, supra note 71, at 220-533 (detailing the
charges brought against Hastings in the English Parliament).
170. 2 BURKE, East-India, supra note 163, at 178.
17 1. Id. at 178-79.
172. See id. Parliament had sold to the company "all that we had to sell; that is our
authority, not our control. We had not a right to make a market of our duties." Id.
173. Id. at 177; see also 2 BURKE, Reflections, supra note 69, at 332 ("[A]s to the share
of power, authority and direction which each individual ought to have in the management




company's abuses bound Burke "to declare against those chartered rights
which produce so many wrongs.
' 
,14
To understand Burke's rejection of the company's charter, it is
necessary to understand just what he thought it provided. The East India
Company had been granted the right by charter to control not only
British trade, but the actual day-to-day relations and governance of all
British-dominated territories in that part of the world.'75 This control, in
Burke's mind, made the company effectively a government of India,
acting under the authority of the British Parliament and the natural law
that rightly ruled all governments."' Like every other government, the
company had no right to rule contrary to the interest of those it ruled.'
77
The company, however, ignored its duties, and the result was
devastation; the company, as bad governments often would, brought
about drastic declines in the population, trade, culture, and revenue of
the land it ruled.'78 Having shown themselves determined to ignore their
chartered duties, Hastings and his supporters in the company had proved
that the company was
totally perverted from the purposes of its institution ... [and]
utterly incorrigible; and because [the company's leaders were]
incorrigible, both in conduct and constitution, power ought to
be taken out of their hands; just on the same principles on
which have been made all the just changes and revolutions of
government that have taken place since the beginning of the
world.'79
By violating Parliament's trust, the company had forfeited its right to
rule, thus making it Parliament's duty, as its superior, to end that rule."s
Although they lost political power to the British, the Indian people had
not forfeited their natural rights. Rather, by acquiring power in India
through the East India Company, "Great Britain made a virtual act of
union with that country, by which they bound themselves as securities for
174. 2 BURKE, East-India, supra note 163, at 193.
175. Id. at 177.
176. Id. at 178.
177. See supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text; see also 2 BURKE, East-India,
supra note 163, at 175-76 (stating that, should it be found impossible to govern India well
without governing Britain poorly, this finding would constitute reason for separation, but
not for sacrificing the people of India to Britain's constitution).
178. EDMUND BURKE, Report of a Committee on the Affairs of India, in 4 THE
WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 39-40 (Bohn ed., 1854)
[hereinafter 4 BURKE, Report on India] (expressing that, under company rule, Madras, in
particular, had lost population, trade, culture, and revenue).
179. 2 BURKE, East-India, supra note 163, at 236.
180. Id. at 178.
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their subjects, to preserve the people in all rights, laws, and liberties,
which their natural original sovereign was bound to enforce."'' . By
accepting power in India, as Francis Canavan observed, the company
became bound
not only by laws of England, but by the charters through which
they received powers from the Mogul Empire in India. By
accepting those powers, [Burke observed that] "they bound
themselves (and bound inclusively all their servants) to perform
all the duties belonging to that new office, and to be held by all
the ties belonging to that new relation.'
8 2
Burke proposed a definite theory of empire, according to which
Britain, the imperial power, had a duty to keep a close eye on colonial
governors to prevent abuses and protect the rights of "dependent
peoples.', 8 3 In addition, Burke was attempting to apply natural law
reasoning consistently to his situation as a constituent part of a body,
Parliament, which had attained political and military power over vast
stretches of land and widely divergent groups of people all across the
world. In seeking to fulfill his own duty to his country and to the natural
law, Burke's solution was to remind his Parliamentary colleagues of their
duty "to conform our government to the character and circumstances of
the several people who composed this [empire's] mighty and strangely
diversified mass. 18 4 To make this possible, it was imperative that
"'[e]very person exercising authority in another country.., be subject to
the laws of that country; since otherwise they break the very covenant by
which we hold our power there.""'85
In Burke's view, Britain could rightfully rule in India only by strictly
adhering to the requirements of natural law, which protected the rights
of the people, including the right to be governed in the manner and by
the people to whom they were accustomed. Hastings, and any other
Briton in a position of power in India, was bound to govern "'the people
181. MARSHALL, supra note 153, at 44.
182. CANAVAN, supra note 65, at 41.
183. See MARSHALL, supra note 153, at 42. Marshall explained:
Burke's model of empire was the Roman one. In discussing the problem of
'calling governors to a strict account' in order to protect peoples who had 'no
distinct privileges secured by constitutions of their own and able to check the
abuse of the subordinate authority,' he gave the House of Commons a
disquisition on Roman history .... Burke saw it as his duty to protect the rights
of the dependent peoples throughout the empire.
Id.
184. EDMUND BURKE, Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, in 2 THE WORKS OF THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 28-29 (Bohn ed., 1854).
185. MARSHALL, supra note 153, at 43.
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of India... according to the largest and most liberal construction of their
laws, rights, usages, institutions[,] and good customs.' 1 '8 6 This policy
required that the Britons protect, rather than undermine, the pre-existing
native aristocracy of India because it was a key component of the native
culture, commanding the loyalties of the people and fulfilling key
functions.18 7 In general terms, Britain's "job" in India was to protect its
people from invasion and otherwise leave them to their own devices as
much as possible. This would be no easy task; it required that
Parliament institute a judicial system in India that protected the rights of
property and the inherited rights of various groups and classes from
abuses of the East India Company.189 Moreover, Burke insisted on
certain specific measures, including the protection of Indians in their own
laws, customs, and magistrates,'9 the extension to Indians of trial by
juries of their peers in dealings with the British, 9' and the retention of
local leaders in posts of authority when possible.9 Because the company
had abused the people's natural rights, protection of those rights
required Parliamentary legislation "intended to form the Magna Charta
of Hindostan .... Whatever the great charter ... [is]to Great Britain,
these bills are to the people of India... and no charter of dominion shall
stand as a bar in my way to their charter of safety and protection. ' '
A charter aimed at clarifying the parties' rights was necessary in order
to preserve the natural rights of one set of people, now ruled by another,
and to protect the integrity of the historically rooted culture of that
people. Thus, Burke's natural law reasoning integrated the essential
elements of history, morality, and politics. Natural law could be served,
even in the context of empire, and natural rights could be respected in
light of the right to be governed in a manner appropriate to historically
186. Id. at 44.
187. See id. at 46.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 42.
190. 4 BURKE, Articles of Charge, supra note 71, at 276 (emphasizing that Hastings
committed an impeachable offense by depriving Indians of their own laws, customs, and
magistrates).
191. 4 BURKE, Report on India, supra note 178, at 11.
192. EDMUND BURKE, Eleventh Report from the Select Committee Appointed To Take
into Consideration the State of the Administration of Justice in the Provinces of Bengal,
Bahar, and Orissa, etc., in 4 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE
142 (explaining that Hastings should have retained local authorities to the extent
possible); see also 4 BURKE, Report on India, supra note 178, at 38 (stating that Hastings
abused his powers and acted unwisely by putting British subjects in all honorable and
lucrative posts, including the army, leaving nothing for the natives).
193. 2 BURKE, East-India, supra note 163, at 179.
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contingent circumstances. However, only careful scrutiny of imperial
governors could accomplish this ideal by ensuring that the governors
acted with self-restraint and respect for the people and cultures they
governed.
A HARD CASE: BURKE AND SLAVERY
One charge that remains to be made against Burke's vision of natural
law is that it provides no means by which to rid any given culture of its
own abuses. Put succinctly: what do we do if the historically authentic
culture includes a practice observers find abhorrent? Burke expended a
great deal of effort attempting to rid the world of one gross human rights
abuse: slavery. His discussion of the issue casts light on how natural law
jurisprudence may approach those deep, culturally ingrained abuses of
natural law. In a 1792 letter to Henry Dundas, "one of His Majesty's
Principal Secretaries of State," Burke included a "Sketch of the Negro
Code" he had written twelve years before. 94 That code was intended to
bring British slave-trading to a gradual end. According to Burke, "[i]f
the African trade could be considered with regard to itself only, and as a
single object, I should think the utter abolition to be, on the whole, more
advisable, than any scheme of regulation and reform. Rather than suffer
it to continue as it is, I heartily wish it at an end."' 95 At the same time,
Burke would allow the trade to continue for years, not because he
desired it to continue, but because the market for which the slave trade
existed continued to flourish in the British West Indies. Thus, "so long as
the slavery continues some means for its supply will be found."'1 96 Burke
observed that "the true origin of the trade was not in the place it was
begun at, but at the place of its final destination."'1 97 This meant, in
Burke's mind, "that the whole work ought to be taken up together; and
that a gradual abolition of slavery in the West Indies ought to go hand in
hand with anything which should be done with regard to its supply from
the coast of Africa." 19 8
Moreover, because British planters would not immediately surrender
their slaves, it would be "better to allow the evil, in order to correct it,
than by endeavouring to forbid, what we cannot be able wholly to
194. EDMUND BURKE, A Letter to the Right Honourable Henry Dundas, One of His
Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, in 5 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
EDMUND BURKE 521 (Bohn ed., 1854) [hereinafter 5 BURKE, Letter to Henry Dundas].
195. Id.
196. Id. at 523.




prevent, to leave it under an illegal, and therefore an unreformed,
existence."'" Thus, Burke's plan sought to regulate the severity of the
slave trade while attacking its sources in the economic and cultural
systems in both the British West Indies and in Western Africa.
Recognizing the abuse of natural law that slavery was, Burke would seek
to end it
through a very slow progress, the chief effect of which is to be
operated in our own plantations, by rendering, in a length of
time, all foreign supply unnecessary. It was my wish, whilst the
slavery continued, and the consequent commerce, to take such
measures as to civilize the coast of Africa by the trade, which
now renders it more barbarous; and to lead by degrees to a
more reputable, and, possibly, a more profitable, [connection]• • 200
with it, than we maintain at present.
In Burke's view, slavery corrupted, and even "crippled," the minds of
all parties involved. 1 Therefore, reform required careful regulation.0 2
In addition, the need for stability in the lives of individuals and cultures
meant that abolition of slavery must be gradual. On this point, the
preamble to Burke's Code is highly enlightening for its integration of
principles of morality, politics, and the force of history. Burke
elaborated:
Whereas it is expedient, and conformable to the principles of
true religion and morality, and to the rules of sound policy, to
put an end to all traffic in the persons of men, and to the
detention of their said persons in a state of slavery, as soon as
the same may be effected without producing great
inconveniences in the sudden change of practices of such long
standing; and, during the time of the continuance of the said
practices, it is desirable and expedient, by proper regulations, to
lessen the inconveniences and evils attendant on the said traffic
and state of servitude, until both shall be gradually done
away[.]
20 3
199. Id. at 523.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 523-24 (arguing that because slavery crippled the minds of both
plantation owners and their slaves, the government would have to use force in teaching
both to live in freedom).
202. Id. at 524 ("[R]egulations must be multiplied; particularly as you have two parties
to deal with. The planter you must at once restrain and support; and you must control, at
the same time that you ease, the servant.").
203. Id. at 525.
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Burke's Code begins with regulations applicable to the slave trade
itself that would require inspection of slave trading vessels for fitness,1 ,
limitations on the number of slaves allowed on any given vessel
according to its capacity,2 05 and mandatory inspection of stores for
sufficient food and drink.2 6 In addition, Burke's Code would empower
British officers to inspect ships during passage20 ' require provision of
some means of entertainment among the slaves,20 ' and provide a bounty
for commanders of ships that adhered to the regulations and lost fewer
than "thirty of their slaves by death" during the passage.2O9
Additionally, Burke's Code sought to protect the slaves from abuses of
their masters once the slaves reached the British West Indies.2 ,0  The
code appointed the colonial attorney general as "protector of negroes
within the island.",21 This protector would look into complaints made by
slaves and protect their due process rights.1 2 Inspectors would keep
track of the "number, sex, age, and occupation[s]" of slaves on each
plantation ." They also would oversee the state of slave trading ships.2 4
Corporal punishment would be strictly limited,"' "good and substantial"
housing required, and limits placed on hours of work for various
reasons including pregnancy, a reward for years of steady service, and
217observance of the Sabbath. More detailed protections would beprovided for slave families, which would have to be sold together and
204. See id. at 525-26.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 526.
207. See id. at 533.
208. See id. at 533-34 (referring to presents, musical instruments, and an allowance of
alcohol to be mixed with water).
209. See id. at 534.
210. Id. The preamble to section IV of Burke's Code reads:
[W]hereas the condition of persons in a state of slavery is such, that they are
utterly unable to take advantage of any remedy which the laws may provide for
their protection, and the amendment of their condition, and have not the proper
means of pursuing any process for the same, but are and must be under
guardianship; and whereas it is not fitting that they should be under the sole
guardianship of their masters, or their attorney and overseers, to whom their
grievances, whenever they suffer any, must ordinarily be owing ....
Id.
211. See id. at 534-35.
212. See id. at 535, 543.
213. See id. at 535.
214. See id. at 536.
215. See id. at 543.
216. See id. at 542.
217. See id. at 541-42.
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could not subsequently be separated by sale. 21' Also, property would be
protected from seizure by masters, and slaves would even be able to' 219
bequeath their possessions as they saw fit.
Burke's Code took particular care to spell out rights of religion and
requirements for the provision of ministers to service the slaves,
educating them in the Church of England or other religious
denominations and keeping records of births, burials, and marriages.
These ministers would employ free black "clerks" to catechize the
slaves.22 ' Further, both individually and as a group, ministers were to
assume responsibility for the schooling of a proportion of the slaves, as
well as the compensation of owners for labor time lost and for the
purchase of particularly intelligent slaves who would be freed and sent to
England for further education.222
Toward the end of the Code, Burke reminds the reader of its purpose:
"gradual manumission of slaves, as they shall seem fitted to fill the offices
of freemen ....,223 His Code would protect the families, churches, and
schools in which free habits are learned while seeking to provide some
form of due process and property rights within the slave system. Finally,
those slaves fulfilling strict requirements in terms of church attendance
and performance of their familial and other duties would be allowed to
purchase freedom of themselves and their families at sub-market rates.224
Perhaps most controversial, but certainly most relevant to a discussion
of the role of natural law in an international context marked by colonial
power, is Burke's discussion of the slave trade in Western Africa.
Burke's Code was intended to stamp out the practice of selling slaves,
218. See id. at 537, 540-42 (emphasizing that marriage also would be encouraged - and
even required - of able bodied slaves). Burke's Code recognized cohabiting individuals as
married and granted them the right to a religious wedding, as well as time off from work
immediately following the wedding; it also punished able-bodied male slaves who refused
the proffer of a wife without naming a preferred alternative wife. Id. at 540-42.
219. See id. at 542.
220. See id. at 537-38.
221. See id. at 537.
222. See id. at 539.
223. See id. at 543-44.
224. Id. at 543. Burke stated:
Every negro slave, being thirty years of age and upwards, and who has had three
children born to him in lawful matrimony, and who hath received a certificate
from the minister of his district, or any other Christian teacher, of his regularity
in the duties of religion, and of his orderly and good behaviour, may purchase, at
rates to be fixed by two justices of peace, the freedom of himself, or his wife or
children, or of any of them separately ....
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not only in the British West Indies, but also in Western Africa.225 Many
may dislike Burke's statement of his determination to "civilize the coast
,,226of Africa by the trade, which now renders it more barbarous ....
Burke, however, was convinced that the slave trade corrupted all whom
it touched, and it would be more fitting to judge him by his proposals
rather than by his choice of language.
What, then, did Burke propose in relation to trade in Western Africa?
His code was intended
to provide against the manifold abuses to which a trade of that
nature is liable, [and provide] that the same may be
accompanied, as far as it is possible, with such advantages to the
natives as may tend to the civilizing them, and enabling them to
enrich themselves by means more desirable, and to carry on
hereafter a trade more advantageous and honourable to all
227parties ....
Of course, the trade had dishonored all parties, including the British.
How would Burke "civilize" the native peoples of Africa? First, the
slave trade would be restricted to specific towns and regulated by the
2281British African Company. Second, the African Company would
provide for churches, schools, and hospitals, erecting and staffing them in
229each town in which the slave trade was practiced. In addition, the
African Company would subsidize craftsmen within each trading town,
each of whom would take "two apprentices from amongst the natives, to
instruct them in the several trades . ,,2. 0 British traders and personnel
were to be held to high standards of conduct so as not to cause scandal
among the local peoples."' The slave trade itself would come under
severe restrictions. 32 Company inspectors would be charged with seeing
to it that no persons would be sold who were
above thirty-five years of age, or who shall appear, on
examination, stolen or carried away by the dealers by surprise;
nor any person, who is able to read in the Arabian or any other
book; nor any woman who shall appear to be advanced three
225. See id. at 522-23 (explaining that "a gradual abolition in slavery in the West Indies
ought to go hand in hand with anything which should be done with regard to its supply
from the coast of Africa").
226. Id. at 523.
227. Id. at 527.
228. See id. at 527-28.
229. Id. at 529.
230. Id.
231. Seeid. at 530.
232. Id. at 530-31 (detailing restrictions on who could be sold).
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months in pregnancy; nor any person distorted or feeble .... or
any person afflicted with a grievous or contagious distemper."'
In this way, Burke's Code would not only protect many classes of
people from enslavement, including all those who had been hunted down
by British traders themselves, but it also would make it much more
difficult and expensive to engage in the slave trade. Moreover, British
traders would come under severe restrictions and suffer banishment and
other possible punishment for misdeeds, including capture, arson, or
murder.234
Burke's plan to "civilize" the peoples of Western Africa thus
amounted to severe restrictions on the activities of the British, the slave
trade in particular, and the provision of churches, schools, hospitals, and
apprenticeships for those who might seek them out in the British trading
towns. Hoping to establish trade in goods other than slaves to help end
the slave trade altogether, Burke sought reforms aimed at redirecting
British interaction with African peoples and emphasizing the religious,
educational, and economic benefits he thought the British, in turn, could
bring to Africa.
CONCLUSION
Burke's approach to the abolition of slavery and the slave trade, a
cause in which "Burke was ahead of his times,, 235 was consistent with his
natural law jurisprudence. A very real evil was to be done away with, but
slowly, so as not to cause undue disturbance to other institutions, laws,
and customs. Moreover, as the British worked to reform their own
economic and social system so as to eliminate slavery, they also would
reform their conduct in Western Africa, promoting civilized arts as the
proper replacement for a barbaric trade in human beings.236
233. Id. at 531.
234. See id. at 531-32.
235. FRANCIS CANAVAN, SELECT WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 253 (Francis Canavan
ed., 1999).
236. See 5 BURKE, Letter to Henry Dundas, supra note 194, at 523. For parallels
between Burkean and contemporary feminist notions of the role of modernization in
shaping cultural practices, see del Prado, supra note 7, at 58. Perhaps the greatest
distinctions between the two views are Burke's insistence on the need for a significant time
period within which a particular cultural practice is to be changed, and his emphasis on
general continuity even when the focus of current discussion is the need for change.
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One should not forget the emphasis Burke placed on the Christian
religion as a source of civilizing reform.237 Some might object to Burke's
desire to "impose" Christianity on other people. Nevertheless, while
clearly believing his own religion to be both true and productive of many
positive results, Burke nowhere proposes forcing the peoples of Western
Africa to become Christians. Instead, Burke seeks merely to present
Western African people with the opportunity to partake in a religion that
he deemed was supported by wise and good men.238
Like most versions of natural law, Burke's was rooted in religion.
However, it remained respectful of varying cultures and ways of life.
Indeed, Burke's historical consciousness allowed him to formulate a
natural law theory that recognizes a variety of means by which societies
can fulfill universal norms in the face of particular and changing
circumstances. Burke argued that all societies have a moral obligation to
respect certain natural rights, principally due process of law, property
rights, rights of the family, and the right to stable political and social
structures. Recognizing the power of historical circumstance and the
stabilizing role of tradition, Burke sought, wherever possible, to address
violations of natural law through prudent actions aimed at maintaining
cultural continuity while obeying the dictates of natural law. His natural
law integrated morality, reason, and history to harmonize individual
rights with the right of people to the integrity of their own culture.
Indeed, his approach to egregious practices violating natural law was
ameliorative rather than revolutionary, and thereby showed greater
respect for people's actual ways of life than for abstract theories that
could destroy long-valued cultures. Thus, African slaves who were
brought to the New World would be, in essence, taught the habits
necessary to succeed in their new environment, while Africans still living
in their indigenous societies would merely be shown other means of
making a living to replace slavery, leaving the bulk of their culture and
society intact. Burke thus sought to redress violations of universal norms
in a manner that would not undermine the people's ongoing way of life.
Perhaps, then, we may find in the natural law tradition the respect for
both cultural authenticity and universal rights that seem so elusive today.
237. See 5 BURKE, Letter to Henry Dundas, supra note 194, at 523 ("I trust infinitely
more ... to the effect and influence of religion, than to all the rest of the regulations [of
the Negro Code] put together.").
238. Id. at 530 (declaring that natives ought "to be led, by all due means, into a respect
for our holy religion, and a desire of partaking of the benefits thereof ... ").
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